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Taxation of Equine Partnerships:
Selected Problems
By CHRIS TROWER,* THOMAS A. DAVIS* * AND ALVIN J. GESKE*"
INTRODUCTION
A partnership is a frequently used business form in the equine
industry, but equine business partners generally are unaware of
the significant tax planning opportunities available to partner-
ships. In some unfortunate situations, equine investors are un-
aware of their status as partners for tax purposes until an adverse
audit commands their attention. This Article, therefore, focuses
on the following major recurring problems involving the taxation
of equine partnerships:
* depreciation and cost recovery strategies for short taxable
years;
* receipt of a partnership interest in exchange for services;
*retroactive and special allocations, and
*like-idnd exchanges of partnership interests.
I. A PRIMER ON PARTNERSHIP TAXATION
The Tax Court has described the partnership sections of the
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code) as a "distressingly com-
plex and confusing" set of rules which "present a formidable
obstacle to the comprehension of these provisions without the ex-
penditure of a disproportionate amount of time and effort even
by one who is sophisticated in tax matters with many years of ex-
perience in the tax field," and as a maze whose "complex provi-
sions may confidently be dealt with by at most only a compar-
* Partner in the Louisville, Kentucky, firm of Brown, Todd & Heyburn. B.A. 1970,
Yale University; J.D. 1976, Harvard Law School.
" Member of the Washington, D.C., firm of Davis & McLeod. B.A. 1960; J.D.,
LL.B. 1963, University of Florida; LL.M. 1967, Georgetown University.
.. Member of the Washingt6n D.C., firm of Davis & McLeod. B.A. 1964, Southern
Methodist University; J.D. 1967, University of Chicago; LL.M. 1974, George Washington
University.
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atively small number of specialists who have been initiated into
its mysteries."I
A. Basic Tax Rules
Notwithstanding the observations of the Tax Court, some
basic rules apply to partnership taxation.
1. Entity Income: The Partnership
A partnership itself does not pay income tax,2 but it does have
"taxable income" computed at the partnership level, 3 the charac-
ter of which is determined as if the partnership were a taxpayer. 4
The partnership is treated as an entity in maldng these computa-
tions. For example, the partnership's holding period for a brood-
mare determines whether or not the broodmare is eligible for sec-
tion 1231 classification; the period for which a particular partner
may have held his or her partnership interest is irrelevant.5
2. Separately Stated Items
"Taxable income" of a partnership is computed in the same
way an individual would compute taxable income, with appro-
priate exceptions to prevent double-dipping such as double de-
ductions for charitable contributibns8 and to exclude peculiarly
individual items such as the personal exemption.1 Additionally, a
large number of items which go into computing an individual's
taxable income-long and short term capital gains and losses,
section 1231 gains and losses and the like-must be "separately
1 Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535, 551 n.9 (1964), al-I'd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d
Cir. 1966).
2 I.R.C. § 701 (1976).
3 Id. § 703(a) (West Supp. 1982).
4 Id. § 702(b) (West Supp. 1982).
5 Id. § 741 (West Supp. 1982); Allen S. Lehman, 7 T.C. 1088 (1946), affd, 165
F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1948). With proper planning, a partner can be taxed at capital gains
rates on an appreciated thoroughbred held for less than two years. If he contributes the
thoroughbred to an existing partnership in a non-taxable § 721 transaction, his capital ac-
count will be credited. The distributing proceeds of a subsequent sale by the partnership of
a different animal held for the requisite period will be taxed at capital gains rates.
6 I.R.C. § 703(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1982).7 Id. § 703(a)(2)(A).
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stated" by a partnership. 8 That is, these items are separately de-
termined at the partnership level by referring only to partnership
operations and are not integrated with other items of income
(such as ordinary income from partnership operations) to deter-
mine the partnership's bottom-line taxable income or loss. 9 Those
items required to be separately stated generally are items which
at the partner level will be aggregated with the individual part-
ner's items of income and/or loss from other sources to determine
final tax treatment.
3. Distributive Shares: Aggregate Taxation
Once partnership taxable income and the separately stated
items are determined on an entity basis, the Code shifts by treat-
ing the partnership as an aggregate of individual taxpayers. 10
Each partner reports his or her "distributive share" of partner-
ship taxable income or loss and of each separately stated item of
income, gain, loss, deduction or credit." Hence, partnership in-
come "flows through" to the partners, and the "character" of an
item at the partnership level is preserved at the partner level by
the reporting of "distributive shares" of separately stated items.' 2
8 Id. § 703(a)(1).
9 Generally speaking, those items required to be separately stated are items which
at the partner level will be aggregated with the individual's partners income and/or loss
from other sources to determine final tax treatment. For example, a partner's distributive
share of partnership § 1231 gains (determined at the partnership level) must be aggregated
at the individual level against the partner's § 1231 gains and/or losses from other ventures
to determine whether or not the individual partner has a net § 1231 gain or loss, and is
therefore entitled to capital gain or ordinary loss treatment, respectively, with respect to
that net number.
Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), is an
example of a taxpayer attempting to create an unusual result, short-term capital gain, at
the partnership level; his other ventures had created otherwise unusable capital losses. See
notes 65-69 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Diamond handling of the
partnership-profits-interest-for-services issue.
1o The Uniform Partnership Act also shifts between the entity and aggregate con-
cepts of a partnership. See Commissioners' Prefatory Note to UNiF. PARTNER SHiP AcT, 6
U.L.A. 5-8 (1968).
n I.R.C. § 702(a) (West Supp. 1982).
12 It must be emphasized that this summary of partnership tax rules is more easily
stated than applied. As recently as 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided a case
wherein the fundamental dispute was whether a partnership was an entity or a conduit.
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4. Basis
The basic rules applicable to partnerships and partners ex-
hibit a similar entity-aggregate schizophrenia. The partnership's
basis13 is used to determine gain or loss on the sale of a partner-
ship asset; the resulting gain or loss is then reported by each part-
ner according to his or her distributive share. On the other hand,
a partner's basis in his or her partnership interest determines
whether the partner has gain or loss on the sale or exchange of his
or her partnership interest or on distribution from the partner-
ship.'4
B. Financial Accounting Matters
A survey of partnership tax rules would be incomplete
without a quick look at the major accounting treatments of part-
nerships and their relationship to partnership tax problems, al-
though no method of financial accounting for partnership oper-
ations is universally accepted.
1. Capital Accounts
Most partnership agreements contain some reference to the
"capital accounts" of the partners. The significance of capital ac-
counts in analyzing partnership tax problems is often stressed,
but the I.R.C., the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) and the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) fail to mention the
concept. When tax practitioners refer to a "capital account" of a
partner, they mean the account stated on the books and records
of .the partnership which expresses the book value of each part-
ner's interest in the partnership. Normally, this account will be
See United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973) (contributions made by employer to a re-
tirement trust established by a medical partnership held to be taxable income to the part-
nership and partners required to report their distributive shares, even though payment
was made directly to the trust and a partner lost his right to participate in the trust upon
leaving the partnership prior to normal retirement).13 Partnership basis in property contributed by a partner equals the adjusted basis of
such property to the contributing partner at the time of the contribution, increased by the
amount (if any) of gain recognized to the contributing partner at such time. I.R.C. § 723
(West Supp. 1982).
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.741-1(a) (1981).
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the sum of the amount of cash and the agreed value of property
contributed to the partnership by the partner, plus the partner's
share of retained earnings, minus the partner's share of losses. As
a general rule, those who prepare the partnership's books do not
distinguish among these components of the capital account. The
account balance is not divided into separate entries for capital
contributions and for results of partnership operations. Nor does
the capital account necessarily reflect the true value of a partner-
ship interest, any more than the net book value per share of cor-
porate stock represents the fair market value of a share. Book
value can never reflect unrealized appreciation or depreciation
in the value of an asset. Moreover, property may have been con-
tributed to the partnership at an agreed value (which establishes
the capital account of the contributing partner) that is more or
less than its fair market value.
2. Drawing, Profit and Retained Earnings Accounts
While many accounting firms routinely determine the results
of partnership operations for a particular fiscal period and then
close the appropriate journal entries to the capital accounts,
some firms do establish separately labeled accounts-variously
called "drawing" accounts, "profit and loss" accounts or "re-
tained earnings" accounts-which are used to reflect the oper-
ations of the partnership, leaving the capital accounts inviolate.
Still other firms close journal entries of operations to drawing or
profit/loss accounts which in turn are closed to the capital ac-
counts. In most cases, the choice of accounting method seems to
be more a matter of a firm's practice or a partnership's prefer-
ence rather than adherence to any general principle of account-
ing theory. If the only function of accountant reports was to pre-
sent the financial operations of the partnership to the partners in
a comprehensive fashion, the choice of method would be of little
consequence. However, because of the unique entity/aggregate
nature of partnerships for both tax and substantive law purposes,
failure to conform the partnership's accounting records to the
partners' intentions underlying the partnership agreement can
cause substantial difficulty.
The potential for such difficulty is illustrated by an arrange-
ment where the partners intend to share operating profits and
10251981-82]
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losses equally even though the initial contributions to the part-
nership are uneven. An example of such a relationship in the
equine industry is a partnership between an owner and a trainer
where the owner contributes the horse and pays out-of-pocket ex-
penses and the trainer contributes only services. The trainer re-
ceives no fees for his or her services except a share of the win-
nings. Once the owner has recovered his or her investment in the
horse plus advance expenses and, in some agreements, a specified
return on investment, the partnership is converted into a fifty-
fifty partnership with the owner and trainer each having a fifty
percent share of the winnings.15
If the owner/trainer partnership is dissolved prior to the re-
turn of the owner's investment, the capital account records of the
partnership may be crucial in determining exactly what amounts
are due each partner and in what priority the partners will share
in the assets of the partnership. For example, if the capital ac-
counts have been kept inviolate, the owner undoubtedly will ar-
gue that he or she is entitled to receive the balance of the capital
account (here, the owner's original investment) before any distri-
butions are made of "profits." Since both the UPA and ULPA
treat capital contributions as debts of the partnership to be satis-
fied prior to any distributions to the partners, 6 the owner may
prevail. Upon such a dissolution, then, the trainer will benefit if
the partnership books have been kept by a firm which closes the
results of operations to the capital accounts. The owner's capital
account will have been reduced by depreciation deductions and
other non-cash expenses, possibly resulting in some "profits" re-
maining to be distributed after the owner has been reimbursed to
the extent of his or her capital account balance.
Suppose in a second hypothetical that our owner and trainer
agree that winnings and expenses are to be shared equally, but
that upon dissolution of the venture, the racing-age thorough-
bred will be returned to the owner. The partnership continues
15 See notes 52-58 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of McDougal v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 720 (1974), a case which involved an equine partnership with this
type of arrangement.16 See UNU?. PARTNERSmp AcT § 40, 6 U.L.A. 468-69 (1969); UNiF. LiNrED PART-
NER HIP AcT § 23, 6 U.L.A. 607 (1969).
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for several years, and the original racehorse is claimed and re-
placed several times by similar claimers before the partnership is
dissolved. At the owner's request, but prior to their reaching an
understanding that the partnership will be dissolved, the trainer
sells the horse to a third party. If the selling price is less than the
original capital account established with respect to the owner's
contribution, the trainer may owe the owner the difference un-
der a strict reading of the UPA, 17 yet it is difficult to believe that
the owner and trainer would have agreed originally to such a re-
sult had they considered the matter.
In such a situation, a court might treat inviolate capital ac-
counts as evidence of the partners' intent that the owner should
recover his or her original investment as a debt of the partnership
for which the trainer is jointly responsible; the court might read
changing capital accounts as evidence to the contrary. If the sell-
ing price is greater than the owner's original capital account and
the partnership agreement is silent as to how the excess is to be
distributed, the partnership's accounting records again can be
crucial to resolving the issue. If the sales proceeds of previously
claimed horses have been credited equally to the respective cap-
ital accounts of the owner and trainer, a court would almost cer-
tainly divide the excess of the selling price over the owner's cap-
ital contribution equally between the parties.
In this Article, the term "capital account" will be used to re-
fer to the account or accounts established on the books and
records of the partnership for each partner which equals his or
her initial capital contribution and, during the term of the part-
nership, is increased by the amount of taxable income allocated
to the partner and decreased by the amount of tax losses allocated
to the partner and by the amount of any cash (or the fair market
value of any property) distributions to the partner. The term
"capital contribution" will be used to refer to the amount of
money or the agreed value of property contributed to the part-
nership by a partner. The capital contribution thus initially es-
tablishes the balance in a partner's capital account, and the cap-
ital account itself thereafter reflects that value as modified by the
17 See UNIF. PARTNERsHnpACr § 40,6 U.L.A. 468-69 (1969).
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results of partnership operations, including the tax incidents of
partnership operations.
II. TAXABLE YEAR MYSTERIES
Under section 706(b)(1), "[tlhe taxable year of a partnership
shall be determined as though the partnership were a tax-
payer."' 8 A partner's distributive share of partnership income or
loss is included in his or her taxable year within or with which
the taxable year of the partnership ends.19 The regulations fur-
ther provide that a partnership return need not be filed before
the first taxable year in which the partnership receives income or
has deductions.20
Thus, a partnership is formed, begins business and is re-
quired to file a partnership informational return for each taxable
year. 21 It sounds simple enough, but the interaction of the depre-
ciation rules with the partnership taxable year rules has made
this a controversial area in the equine industry. The controversy
is exacerbated because the economic rhythms of the thorough-
bred business call for purchases of horses in the second half of the
taxable year, and the vast majority of horses are purchased in the
final quarter of the calendar year.
18 I.R.C. § 706(b)(1) (1976).
19 I.R.C. § 706(a) (1976).
0 Treas. Beg. § 1.6031-1(a), T.D. 7564, 1978-2 C.B. 19, 66. This regulation states
as follows:
For purposes of filing a partnership return, an unincorporated organization
will not be considered within the meaning of section 761(a), to carry on a
business, financial operation, or venture as a partnership before the first tax-
able year in which such organization receives income or incurs any expendi-
tures treated as deductions for federal income tax purposes.
Id. I.R.C. § 761(a) (Supp. IV 1980) defines a partnership as a "syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any bus-
iness, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning
of this title, a corporation or a trust or estate."
21 The adoption of a taxable year for the partnership is not necessarily a routine issue
which the partners have absolute discretion to resolve. I.R.C. § 706(b)(1) (1976) states
that "[a] partnership may not change to, or adopt, a taxable year other than that of all its
principal partners unless it establishes, to the satisfaction of the Secretary, a business pur-
pose therefor." A principal partner is defined as one "having an interest of five percent or
more in partnership profits or capital." I.R.C. § 706(b)(3) (1976). The purpose of this rule
is to prevent partnerships from choosing taxable years ending on January 31, thus produc-
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A. The Problem and the Opportunity
From an economic standpoint, a taxpayer benefits by invest-
ing money in an income-producing enterprise for most of the cal-
endar year, followed by a year-end investment which generates
non-cash deductions such as depreciation to shelter the cash in-
come from taxation. For example, under the law prior to the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), a taxpayer who in-
vested $1,000 on January 1 in a money market fund earning an
annual interest rate of twelve percent could have withdrawn on
November 30 the original $1,000 investment plus $110 in money
market interest. The taxpayer could then have borrowed $9,000
on December 1 and invested the borrowed funds with the orig-
inal $1,000 to purchase a thoroughbred stallion share for
$10,000, which we will assume was being depreciated using the
straight-line method over an eight-year life. The one year depre-
ciation deduction would have been $1,250, and monthly depre-
ciation deductions would have been $104. For the year, our hy-
pothetical investor/horse owner would have reported a taxable
income of $110 (interest income) minus $104 (depreciation de-
ductions), or only $6. However, the strategy outlined above
would have backfired economically if the earnings on the stallion
share could not cover the debt service on the $9,000.
Tax planners have, therefore, strained their imaginations to
develop techniques which allow the taxpayer to claim a depre-
ciation deduction with respect to a period during which the tax-
payer still had the use of his or her money. To return to our
example, the idea is to permit the horse owner to keep the cash
invested in money market funds through November 30, but to
obtain depreciation deductions computed as if he or she had pur-
chased the stallion share prior to December 1.
B. The Averaging Conventions Under pre-1981 Law
Before the enactment of ERTA, the depreciation regulations
ing an 11-month deferral for their partners who will have received cash distributions dur-
ing the year but who will not have to report the partnership income on their individual re-
turns for that year. For an example of a taxpayer attempt to circumvent this rule by char-
acterizing certain partnership payments as "guaranteed payments" under I.R.C. § 707(c)
(1976), see Pratt v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1977).
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generally provided that depreciation of an asset begins when the
asset is placed in service and that depreciation is allowable only
for the proportionate part of the year during which the asset is in
service.2 Thus, in our example, the horse owner would normally
be required to compute depreciation on the stallion share ac-
quired at year-end by taking only one month of depreciation. 2
An asset-by-asset and date-by-date computation of
depreciation deductions would be unduly burdensome for any
business which acquired a number of depreciable assets at differ-
ent times during the calendar year. The Department of Treasury
(Treasury), therefore, adopted regulations permitting taxpayers
who record depreciable property in multiple asset accounts and
use the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) system to use one of two
averaging conventions to determine depreciation deductions. 2
Taxpayers electing to depreciate assets under the "half-year"
convention are permitted to treat all property in an ADR account
as if it had been "placed in service on the first day of the second
half of the taxable year."es Taxpayers using the "modified half-
year" convention are required to treat all property "placed in ser-
vice during the first half of the taxable year as placed in service
on the first day of the taxable year"' ' and all property "placed in
service during the second half of the taxable year as placed in ser-
vice on the first day of the succeeding taxable year." ' As would
be expected, taxpayers who generally purchased most of their de-
preciable property during the first six months of the calendar
year elected the "modified half-year" convention, while those
who generally acquired depreciable property in the latter half of
the year usually elected the "half-year" convention.
Where the averaging conventions were used by existing part-
nerships with full taxable years or by horse owners operating as
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-10(b) (1982).
2 The method of computing depreciation is immaterial. The question is what por-
tion of an otherwise allowable depreciation deduction for one year is permitted to a tax-
payer who acquires property and places it in service for less than a full taxable year.
24 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-ll(c)(2), T.D. 7272, 1973-1 C.B. 82, 95. Prior to the 1982
amendment, it came in through T.D. 6500 (1960).
2 Treas. Beg. § 1.167(a)-ll(c)(2)(iii), T.D. 7272, 1973-1 C.B. 82,96.
28 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(c)(2)(ii), T.D. 7272, 1973-1 C.B. 82,96.
2 Id.
1030 [Vol. 70
EQUN PARTNERSMHS
sole proprietorships, the conventions seemed no more than a
reasonable compromise between theory and the exigencies of tax
administration. After all, acquisitions of depreciable property
should be made at all times during the calendar year so that the
net effect of the use of the conventions over a number of years
would approximate deductions otherwise allowable using an as-
set-by-asset and date-by-date method. However, taxpayers, and
especially horse owners, tend to concentrate on the April 15 tax
return deadline alone and to structure their business activities to
avoid the leveling effect of the conventions in subsequent years.
A favorite strategy in the past was to form a limited partnership
and acquire depreciable assets such as broodmares at the fall
bloodstock sales. The partnership then elected the "half-year"
convention and claimed six months of depreciation on the brood-
mares, and the limited partner investors still used their funds for
much more than six months of the year to produce income which
would be sheltered by the non-cash depreciation deductions. Be-
cause the partnership would seldom purchase additional brood-
mares in subsequent years (except as replacements), the funda-
mental premise of the convention-regular purchases over sev-
eral years at different times-failed; thus, no deductions were
ever postponed by operation of the conventions.
To combat this problem, the Treasury finalized regulations
in early 1981 which dealt with the use of the depreciation averag-
ing conventions under the ADR System by entities with less than
a full taxable year.2 Those regulations provide that the averaging
conventions will apply only within the particular short taxable
year of an entity and that the determination of when a partner-
ship begins will be based upon all the facts and circumstances
rather than upon the organizational documents of the partner-
ship. 9 For example, a partnership formed on December I which
adopts the half-year convention would be entitled to only fifteen
days of depreciation.-I Additionally, a question of intent can
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(c)(2)(iv)(c) and (d), T.D. 7763,1981-1 C.B. 80,81.
2 Treas. Beg. § 1.167(a)-ll(c)(2)(iv)(c), T.D. 7763,1981-1 C.B. 80,81.
30 The application of these regulations to our hypothetical horse investor who pur-
chases an interest in a broodmare partnership late in the year would be as follows. The
beginning of the "taxable year" for income tax purposes will not be determined by the
1981-82] 1031
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arise in determining when the partnership is "formed" for tax-
ation purposes. Suppose a partnership purchases a thoroughbred
early in the year and conducts some minimal business activities,
but does not commence major operations until December 1. The
Internal Revenue Service (Service) may argue that the partner-
ship did not begin until December and is thus entitled to deduct
only fifteen days of depreciation. The pertinent regulation pro-
vides:
[I]f a person engages in a small amount of trade or business ac-
tivity for the purpose of obtaining a disproportionately large
depreciation deduction for assets for the taxable year in which
they are placed in service, and placing those assets in service
represents a substantial increase in the person's level of bus-
iness activity, then for purposes of depreciating those assets the
person will not be treated as beginning a trade or business until
the increased amount of business activity begins. 31
Presumably, the focus on taxpayer "purpose" will be most
easily resolved in the egregious cases. Tax shelter partnerships es-
tablished and marketed for the sole purpose of using averaging
conventions to produce depreciation benefits cannot expect sym-
pathetic treatment from the Service, since it is precisely these
stratagems against which the regulations are directed. On a prac-
tical level, however, it will be difficult to determine a prohibited
purpose in the equine industry, and horse owners and their pro-
fessional advisers should be alert to the use of the averaging con-
ventions to maximize deductions in appropriate circumstances. 2
C. Short Taxable Years Under ERTA
ERTA mandates a re-evaluation of traditional conceptual
and technical approaches to depreciation questions. Under
ERTA, the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) abolishes
state law existence vel non of the partnership. According to the regulations, "the taxable
year of the person placing such property in service does not include any month before the
month in which the person begins engaging in a trade or business or holding depreciable
property for the production of income." Id.
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(c) (2)(iv)(d), T.D. 7763, 1981-1 C.B. 80, 81.
32 See part IV infra for a discussion of the use of short taxable year strategies com-
bined with retroactive allocation.
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the useful life concept and accelerated depreciation methods
which have dominated tax planning. The ACRS percentages,
which are multiplied by the original cost basis of property to de-
termine the cost recovery deduction, contain built-in averaging
conventions so that the cost recovery deduction is determined
without regard to when property is placed in service during a
taxable year. 14
Even under ERTA, however, the taxable year problem rears
its ugly head. Section 168(f)(5)1 provides that where a taxpayer
has a taxable year of less than twelve months, the amount of the
cost recovery deduction otherwise available will be prorated ac-
cording to the number of months in the short taxable year. If a
broodmare partnership operating on a calendar year basis is
organized under state law on January 1, it arguably has a tax-
able year which is not less than twelve months. However, section
168(f)(5) states that "[tihe determination of when a taxable year
begins shall be made in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the Secretary."' No regulations have yet been promulgated,
but Revenue Ruling 82-110-8 suggests that the Service will be hos-
tile to taxpayer attempts to manipulate the taxable year for extra
depreciation deductions.
The ruling involved a partnership organized on December
15, 1977, to acquire and hold title to an ocean-going oil tanker.
The partnership, which used the calendar year as its taxable
year, elected to claim depreciation under the ADR system and
adopted the half-year convention. The partnership actually re-
ceived no income and incurred no deductible expenses until it ac-
quired the oil tanker on December 20, 1978.- Its attempt to take
six months of depreciation for property actually in service during
31 See I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1982).
34 See id. See also S. REP. No. 97-144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 39, reprinted in 1981
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 105,145.
2 I.R.C. § 168(f)(5) (West Supp. 1982).
36 For example, if a partnership formed on October 1 acquires a broodmare on that
date and elects the calendar year as its taxable year, the partnership would be entitled to
claim a cost recovery deduction of one-fourth of the 15% deduction otherwise available
under ACRS.
37 I.R.C. § 168(0(5) (West Supp. 1982).
- Rev. Rul. 82-110, 1982-22 I.R.B. 8.39 Id.
10331981-821
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only ten days of the taxable year was disallowed in the ruling. 40
The Service held that the beginning of the partnership's initial
taxable year for purposes of applying the half-year convention
occurred on December 20, 1978, the date the partnership began
to incur expenses and receive income.41 Since the partnership had
elected the half-year convention, it was limited by the Service to
six days rather than six months of depreciation.42 Therefore, cau-
tious practitioners will advise their equine industry clients that
an aggressive approach toward the taxable year controversy that
does not reflect the substance of the partnership tax year un-
doubtedly will generate resistance by the Service.
D. Planning Techniques
Horse owners and their advisors are using a number of tech-
niques to deal with the short taxable year question under ERTA.
The success of these techniques, of course, has yet to be deter-
mined.
40 Athough Revenue Ruling 82-110 deals with property acquired and placed in ser-
vice prior to the effective date of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), it pro-
vides ample evidence of the Service's predictable action under ERTA, especially since the
ruling involved the acquisition of property prior to the effective date of the regulations
limiting the application of the averaging conventions in situations where the taxpayer was
in existence for a full year but conducted no business until the end of the year. See note 28
supra and accompanying text for a discussion of these regulations.
41 Rev. Rul. 82-110, 1982-22 I.R.B. 8. The Service's analysis in this ruling leaves
much to be desired. The holding is based upon Treas. Reg. § 1.603-1(a)(1), T.D. 8564,
1978-2 C.B. 19, 66, which provides: "For purposes of filing a partnership return, an unin-
corporated organization will not be considered ... to carry on a business, financial oper-
ation, or venture as a partnership before thefirst taxable year in which such organization
receives income or incurs any expenditures treated as deductions ..... Id. (emphasis
added). However, this Regulation is not intended to advise when a partnership's taxable
year begins but is designed to tell a partnership when it must file a return. The language
emphasized above implies that the taxable year may begin prior to the receipt of income or
the incurring of expenditures. Therefore, the Service's reliance on the Regulation appears
to be misplaced, but the Service may be betting on a conceptual longshot in an attempt to
discourage a perceived tax avoidance technique.4 2 It is interesting to note that the partnership would have been entitled to 11 days of
depreciation under the asset-by-asset method. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-10(b) (West Supp.
1982). Therefore, the partnership's attempt to use the half-year convention cost it five days
of depreciation on an asset with a cost basis of $42 million. With stallions being syndicated
at numbers around $20 million and with the substantial growth of publicly-financed lim-
ited partnerships in the equine industry, similarly important decisions may come from the
equine industry in the next few years.
EQUINE PARTNERSHIPS
1. Churning
The accelerated cost recovery system established by ERTA is
only available for "recovery property" as defined by section
168. 41 To prevent taxpayers from transferring record ownership
of property in 1981 and succeeding years in a fashion which does
not alter the basic economic relationship of the taxpayer to the
property, but which would make the property eligible for faster
deductions under ACRS than under pre-1981 law, section
168(e)44 includes several anti-churning rules. 45 Perhaps because
the short taxable year rules under ERTA are part of the statute,
some horse owners have tried to avoid their application by inten-
tionally failing the anti-churning tests, believing that an advan-
tage may be gained if property is not "recovery property" subject
to the short taxable year rules of the 1981 legislation.
Although failing the anti-churning tests will not result in de-
preciation deductions for a greater number of months (or days)
than the period of ownership, in many circumstances it will pro-
vide greater depreciation deductions in the short tax year (year of
acquisition) than applying ACRS with the 1981 short tax year
rules. The greater deductions under pre-1981 rules stem from
two factors: 1) pre-1981 law may allow use of a shorter useful
life and 2) if the partnership acquires the horse at the beginning
of its short taxable year, it is not disadvantaged by the ACRS
rules which mandate a half-year convention (by combining a
percentage based upon a half-year convention with the short tax
43 I.R.C. § 168(c) (West Supp. 1982). "Recovery property" is that property placed
into service by the taxpayer after January 1, 1981, which is in a trade or business or held
for the production of income. Id.
44 I.R.C. § 168(e) (West Supp. 1982).
45 If a taxpayer acquires property in a taxable transaction from a transferor who is a
"related person," the property is not recovery property. I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(A)(i) (West
Supp. 1982). A partner and a partnership will be considered "related" if the partner has
more than a 10% interest in the capital or profits of the partnership. I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(D)
(West Supp. 1982). The anti-churning rules also exclude from the definition of "recovery
property" any property which is transferred to a partnership as a non-taxable contribution
to capital under I.R.C. § 721 (1976), "to the extent that the basis of the property is deter-
mined by reference to the basis of the property in the hands of the transferor ......
I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1982). Since I.R.C. § 723 (1976) prescribes a full carry-
over basis for the partnership with respect to property contributed by a partner under
I.R.C. § 721 (1976), property contributed by a partner who used it prior to 1981 will not
be eligible for ACRS treatment.
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year rules). Of course, there are situations in which intentional
failure of the anti-churning rules will not result in greater first
year deductions than under ACRS. Thus, the more responsible
conclusion for planning purposes is that, as long as the percent-
age of adjusted basis which could be taken as a depreciation de-
duction during a full taxable year is no greater under the old law
than under the 1981 legislation," intentionally failing the anti-
churning rules will do nothing to help a taxpayer with a short
taxable year.
2. Early Partnership Formation; Late Admission of Investors
A horse owner who thinks ahead can improve the chances of
maximizing depreciation deductions by forming partnerships
early in the year and then admitting investors and purchasing
property later in the year. This technique at least permits the
partnership to claim on the basis of facts and circumstances that
its taxable year begins on the date of organization and should be
respected for depreciation/cost recovery purposes.47 It is impor-
tant, however, that the horse owner not forget the realities of the
tax world.
Whether the full year will be respected for tax purposes will
46 It might be possible with respect to particular thoroughbreds to produce a higher
deduction under the old law than under ERTA. For example, broodmares more than 13
years old would be depreciated over three years under ERTA, I.R.C. § 168(h)(1) (West
Supp. 1982), but over as little as two years under prior law, based upon industry useful life
guidelines which were generally accepted by the Service for depreciation purposes. The
availability of a shorter useful life would, however, offer a separate reason for transgress-
ing the anti-churning rules and would have nothing to do with the short taxable year issue.
However, the other significant factor is that, even in short tax years, ERTA mandates a
half-year convention through the percentages selected, and prior law allows the partner-
ship to obtain a full year's depreciation on the assets acquired at the beginning of its tax-
able year (short or otherwise).47 As far as partnership law is concerned, a partnership can be structured so its exis-
tence begins early in the year but admits investors toward the end of the year. See UNiF.
PARTNERSHIP ACr § 17, 6 U.L.A. 207 (1969); UNiF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACr § 2(MX, 6
U.L.A. 568 (1969).
"Offering' materials describing a limited partnership organized between the gen-
eral partner and an initial limited partner who withdraws from the partnership upon the
admission of additional limited partners are common. Typically, these deals split profits,
leases and the tax incidents of partnership operations (which will by definition be fairly
limited) between the general partner and the initial limited partner on a 99:1 basis. Cf.
EQUINE PARTNERSHIPS
probably depend upon whether or not the taxpayer had begun
"engaging in a trade or business or holding depreciable property
for the production of income 48 at the time of organization. Be-
cause the Service has traditionally denied favorable treatment to
a taxpayer who engages "in a small amount of trade or business
activity for the purpose of obtaining a disproportionately large
depreciation deduction,"' 49 there can be no assurance that any
particular situation will succeed. Of course, to the extent that a
taxpayer acquires a substantial number of horses for the partner-
ship early in the year, the tax shelter benefits of the technique are
diminished.
Also, if a partnership if formed early in the year and antic-
ipates acquiring substantial assets late in the year after the ad-
mission of investors, special care should be taken in determining
whether the deal should be structured to violate the anti-churn-
ing rules. The regulations under section 168(f)(5)0° have not yet
been promulgated, and it may be some time before they are, but
the simplicity of ERTA could well work in favor of post-1980
partnerships. As long as those partnerships simply claim the au-
thorized ERTA percentages for a full taxable year, as opposed to
the complicated red flag elections of the averaging conventions
under old law, the practical dangers of such a course might be
substantially limited.
3. Co-Ownership
One solution to the short taxable year problem may be co-
ownership of the horses rather than partnership ownership. Since
each individual owns an undivided interest in the property, the
taxable year in question is the individual's taxable year and a full
Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438. Upon the admission of the investor limited partners,
the percentages switch to those called for by the deal.
It might be thought that early organization followed by late admission of investor
limited partners would cause a termination of a partnership for tax purposes because of
the 50% rule of I.R.C. § 708(b)(1) (1976). However, Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b) (ii) indicates
that the 50% rule applies to a sale or exchange of partnership interests and that a contribu-
tion of property to the partnership is not a sale or exchange.
48 See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(C)(2)(iv)(d), T.D. 7763, 1981-1 C.B. 80,81.
'o I.R.C. § 168(0(5) (West Supp. 1982).
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ACRS deduction would be available. This technique would work
for a stallion syndicate, which usually is structured as a regime of
co-ownership rather than a partnership, and it also applies to
smaller partnerships where co-ownership of specific horses by a
few individuals may be a realistic alternative.,"
For partnerships involving more individuals- almost all pri-
vate offerings of partnership interests to limited partner investors
and public offerings-co-ownership will not be a feasible alter-
native from a practical standpoint even though in a properly
structured deal a co-ownership will work from a tax standpoint.
These partnerships typically require use of a managing agent,
and the limited partners always are concerned with preserving
their limited liability status. In a co-ownership arrangement, the
liability of entrepreneurs would be limited only by stop-loss or in-
demnification agreements of the operator, and even then would
depend upon the resources of the operator available to satisfy
these agreements. Thus, from a marketing and logistical stand-
point, co-ownership will not be a useful alternative for most
partnerships.
III. RECEIPT OF A PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
IN EXCHANGE FOR SERVICES
Determining the proper treatment of the receipt of a partner-
ship interest in exchange for services is a common issue in the
equine industry. This issue arises whenever an owner transfers to
a trainer an interest in the earnings of one or more thorough-
breds, and whenever a stallion share owner or syndicate manager
and a mare owner make an arrangement with respect to the off-
spring of a particular breeding. It also may arise in the receipt of
51 If the individuals are to own race horses or broodmares, it may be difficult to
structure a co-ownership which is not treated as a partnership for federal income tax pur-
poses. The Code provides that "the term 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group, pool,
venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any bus-
iness, financial operation, or venture is carried on and which is not, within the meaning of
this title, a trust or estate or a corporation." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2)(1976). The carrying on of
racing activities and sharing of profits and losses, or the breeding of horses (including the
raising of the foals) and the sharing of profits and losses, may well be treated by the IRS as
the carrying on of a business or venture resulting in partnership treatment, although this
result may be avoided through careful planning in some circumstances.
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syndicate shares by trainers, veterinarians, syndicate promoters
or other persons who will not perform substantial services for the
syndicate but are in essence being rewarded for prior service,
usually rendered prior to the stallion's retirement to stud. The
following discussion deals primarily with two leading cases in
which some of these issues arose.
A. The Trainer's Dilemma: McDougal
One of the cases in this area, McDougal v. Commissioner,52
involved a partnership between an owner and a trainer. The
owner purchased a thoroughbred named Iron Card for $10,000,
a price which was depressed because the horse had a condition
diagnosed as a protein allergy. The owner promised his trainer a
half interest in Iron Card, once the owner recovered the costs
and expenses of acquiring the colt, in exchange for the trainer's
attending to the colt. Significantly, this promise was not made in
lieu of payment of the standard trainer's fees, which during the
course of the arrangement were paid to the trainer according to
his customary charges. The trainer successfully treated the colt's
condition, and within ten months from the date of its acquisition
by the owner, several purchase offers were made, one.of which
reached $60,000. The owner decided to keep the horse, however,
and, after recovering his costs of acquiring the horse, transferred
a one-half interest in Iron Card to the trainer.0
In the Tax Court, the owner, while conceding that he had
realized a gain on the transfer equal to the difference between
the value of the one-half interest given up and his adjusted basis
in that one-half interest, contended that he was entitled to a
$30,000 business expense deduction representing the value of the
property transferred to the trainer as compensation for services
rendered. Thus, the owner was effectively deriving a tax bene-
fit to the extent of the difference between the taxes saved by the
ordinary $30,000 deduction and the smaller amount of taxes paid
on the reported capital gain.ss In contrast, the Commissioner
52 62 T.C. 720 (1974).
5 Id. at 721-22.
Id. at 723.
Even with respect to the proportion of the gain attributable to previously claimed
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contended that the owner and the trainer had entered into a
partnership to which the owner contributed Iron Card and to
which the trainer agreed to contribute his services. 0
Thus, the owner's conveyance would have been structured as
a nontaxable transfer to a partnership in exchange for an interest
in the partnership, with the partnership taking a carry-over basis
in the thoroughbred, limited under section 723 to the owner's ad-
justed basis for the horse,5 or no more than $10,000. Under the
taxpayer/owner's theory, the partnership's basis for future depre-
ciation deductions would be $30,000 (the trainer's cost basis for
his one-half interest), plus something a bit less than $5,000 (the
owner's allocable cost basis in the retained one-half interest).
The Tax Court agreed with the owner:
When on the formation of a joint venture a party contributing
appreciated assets satisfies an obligation by granting his obli-
gee a capital interest in the venture, he is deemed first to have
transferred to the obligee an undivided interest in the assets
contributed, equal in value to the amount of the obligation so
satisfied. He and the obligee are deemed thereafter and in con-
cert to have contributed those assets to the joint venture.
The contributing obligor will recognize gain on the trans-
action to the extent that the value of the undivided interest
which he is deemed to have transferred exceeds his basis there-
in. The obligee is considered to have realized an amount equal
to the fair market value of the interest which he receives in the
venture and will recognize income depending upon the charac-
ter of the obligation satisfied.-"
The McDougal case, standing for the proposition that the
transfer of a partnership interest in exchange for services ren-
dered is a taxable transaction both to the transferor and the
depreciation, capital gain treatment was available because the transaction occurred prior
to the enactment in 1969 of the depreciation recapture provisions. Actually, the taxpayer
was not performing any magic; he could have sold a one-half interest in Iron Card for
$30,000 cash, reported the capital gain, and then paid the trainer $30,000 in cash and
taken a deduction. Surely the Service would not have challenged the propriety of the cap-
ital gainlordinary loss alchemy if cash had been used rather than an in-kind payment, al-
though the amount of the deduction could have been challenged as unreasonable.
0 Id. at 724.
57 See note 13supra.
8 62 T.C. at 725-26 (footnotes omitted).
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transferee, is not governed by the general non-recognition rule of
section 721.59 Because the specific facts of McDougal are unlikely
to be repeated in many transactions, the case might be regarded
as a judicial derelict. But McDougal has wide application in the
equine industry, particularly to the receipt of so-called "trainer's
shares" in stallion syndicates. Typically, ownership of the stallion
is divided into forty equal shares or fractional interests. Each co-
owner is entitled to one "free nomination" 6 to the stallion for
each share owned and, additionally, is entitled to participate in
drawing for excess or shortfall nominations in accordance with
the procedures described in the syndication agreement. Some
syndicate agreements additionally provide a nomination for the
person who trained the stallion during its racing career; general-
ly, this nomination is not contingent upon the trainer's continu-
ing to serve in any particular capacity.
Regardless, syndicate agreements often attempt to character-
ize the trainer's share or nomination as being received on an an-
nual basis in exchange for future services. A typical agreement
provides that the trainer "shall during the term of this Agreement
promote the value of the Stallion as a stud at thoroughbred race-
tracks and thoroughbred auction sales, and will upon request
consult with the Syndicate Manager concerning the selection of
thoroughbred mares most suitable to the Stallion."61 Whether the
trainer's nomination is actually earned on a year-to-year basis by
the trainer after the syndication of the stallion or is received by
the trainer as compensation for services previously rendered to
the owners is a question of fact. But, under McDougal, if it is de-
termined that the trainer's nomination is compensation for prior
services, then its fair market value is both includable in the
trainer's income in the year of receipt and deductible by the
owners as an ordinary and necessary business expense.62 Because
59 No gain or loss is recognized by a partnership or its partners where a contribution
of property is made to a partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership. I.R.C.
§ 721 (1976).
60 A "free nomination" is generally defined in an agreement as the right to breed one
mare to the stallion in a breeding season.
61 At a seminar sponsored by Gainesway Farm in the fall of 1980, this specific lan-
guage was recommended by one of Kentucky's leading equine accounting firm.
62 See text accompanying note 59 supra. Cf. Pessin v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 473
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a syndicated stallion will almost by definition be worth consider-
ably more than the price paid for the horse, the owners-even in
a world of depreciation recapture-can still obtain a useful ordi-
nary deduction at the price of a taxable gain, the majority of
which will be capital in nature.
B. Profits Interests
McDougal considered the tax consequences of a transfer of
an interest in partnership capital. But an agreement between an
owner and trainer that, upon the owner's recovery of original in-
vestment, they will divide all future net earnings equally, with
the owner receiving all proceeds upon the horse being claimed or
sold, would involve the transfer of only a "profits interest" in a
partnership. Until 1971, such a transfer, even when in compen-
sation for services rendered, was considered to be a nontaxable
transaction. This view was based upon a parenthetical clause
contained in Treasury Regulation section 1.721-1(b)(1),63 which
provides:
Normally, under local law, each partner is entitled to be re-
paid his contributions of money or other property to the part-
nership ... whether made at the formation of the partnership
or subsequent thereto. To the extent that any of the partners
gives up any part of his right to be repaid his contributions (as
distinguished from a share in partnership profits) in favor of
another party as compensation for services ... section 721
does not apply. The value of an interest in such partnership
capital so transferred to a partner as compensation for services
constitutes income to the partner under section 61. 64
In Diamond v. Commissioner,65 however, the Tax Court
held that the parenthetical clause of the regulations did not make
the receipt of a profits interest in exchange for services nontax-
able. Under the partnership agreement in Diamond, the tax-
(1972) (veterinarian who received lifetime breeding in stallions at time of syndication re-
quired to report fair market value as immune in year of receipt).
63 Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960).
64 Id. (emphasis added).
6 56 T.C. 530 (1971), affd per curiam, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
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payer had been granted a sixty percent interest in the partnership
profits in exchange for his services; further, upon a sale of the
partnership's sole asset, an office building, the taxpayer was en-
titled to sixty percent of the net proceeds after the contributing
partner had been reimbursed for the funds expended by him in
the acquisition of the property. Less than three weeks after exe-
cution'of the partnership agreement, the taxpayer sold his inter-
est for $40,000 in an arm's length transaction. 6 Thus, the Tax
Court was presented with a set of facts which arguably involved
a pure profits interest that had an ascertainable and substantial
fair market value.
The Tax Court noted that the regulations make the non-
recognition provisions of section 721 inapplicable in the case of a
taxpayer who has received an interest in the capital contribution
made by another partner. 67 But the court refused to assign any
significance to the parenthetical clause which consistently has
been thought by practitioners to distinguish between the treat-
ment of capital and profits interests. Terming the draftsmanship
of the regulations "obscure" and "opaque," the Tax Court de-
clared:
[The parenthetical clause] excludes that type of situation from
the rule which the regulations affirmatively set forth in respect
of readjustments of capital interests; but it does not deal one
way or the other with situations described in the parenthetical
clause .... [W]hat is plain is that the regulations do not call
for the applicability of section 721 where a taxpayer has per-
formed services for someone who has compensated him there-
for by giving him an interest in a partnership that came into
being at a later date. 6
On this analysis, the Tax Court held that Diamond received
$40,000 in compensation income when he received the interest in
the partnership. 69
6156 T.C. at 532-39.
67 Id. at 545-46.
68 Id. at 546.
69 Id. The Tax Court's decision has been severely criticized. See, e.g., Cowan, Re-
ceipt of an Interest in Partnership Profits in Consideration for Services: The Diamond
Case, 27 TAx L. REv. 161 (1972), but it has never been abandoned by the Service, and no
contrary authority has appeared.
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The trainer, therefore, who provides services in exchange for
an interest in partnership profits and/or capital is faced with a
potentially significant tax problem. One might argue that the
Diamond rationale applies only in those instances where the in-
terest received has a readily ascertainable market value.70 Alter-
natively, it might be argued that Diamond can be distinguished
as having involved the transfer of both a profits and a caplital in-
terest, since Diamond received, in exchange for his services, not
only an interest in profits, but also an interest in the sole asset of
the partnership.71
Either theory would allow a trainer to escape taxation at the
time the interest is granted both in the situation of a racing part-
nership where future net winnings are to be shared and in the
more difficult situation where a trainer receives a nomination in
a stallion syndicate. In the first case, no transfer of a capital in-
terest has occurred because the owner is entitled to all the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the thoroughbred. Since the future net win-
nings from racing are obviously totally speculative, a strong ar-
gument can be made that even if Diamond requires recognition
of any income realized, no income has been realized because the
value of the profits interest received is either nominal or not as-
certainable. In the second case, the argument would be that, as
the trainer is never entitled to a share of the proceeds of the sale
of the stallion once he begins stud service, no capital interest has
been transferred. Additionally, the value of the stallion's services
as a stud to the trainer are quite speculative, because, at the time
the nomination is received, the stallion's fertility will normally
not have been established, and the future value of the stud ser-
vices are uncertain; moreover, the value of the nomination may
depend upon the mares available to the trainer. 72
C. A Practical Approach
Section 83 of the Code,73 which became effective after the oc-
70 This factor played an important role in the Seventh Circuit's opinion upholding
the Tax Court's decision. 492 F.2d at 288.
71 See note 66 supra and accompanying text.72 But see Pessin v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. at 473 (value of lifetime nominations to
stallion being syndicated taxed to veterinarian upon receipt; value determined without re-
gard to quality of mares but with regard to fertility of stallions).
73 I.R.C. § 83 (1976).
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currence of the transactions involved in McDougal and Di-
amond, arguably has rendered moot the dispute about the cor-
rectness and reach of the Diamond case. Section 83 provides in
general that if "property" is transferred to any person "in connec-
tion with the performance of services," then the "fair market
value" of the property (less any amount paid for the property)
must be included in the gross income of the person who per-
formed the services "in the first taxable year in which the rights
of the person having the beneficial interest in such property are
transferrable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture,
whichever is applicable."74
Although there is some question whether section 83 was in-
tended to include partnership interests (or at least profits inter-
ests) in its definition of "property," 75 a regulation under section
83 embraces as property all "real and personal property other
than money or an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay de-
ferred compensation." 76 Undoubtedly, a partnership profits in-
terest is personalty under section 26 of the Uniform Partnership
Act,77 and is not an unfunded, unsecured promise to pay deferred
compensation. Section 83, however, was designed to respond to
the use of stock options and restricted stock options as a means of
converting ordinary income into capital gain. While its language
is broad enough to reach partnership profits interests, nothing
suggests that the section was drafted to change the basic rules
governing whether a taxable event occurs (that question argu-
ably having been settled by the regulations under section 721
promulgated after enactment of the 1954 Code) upon receipt of a
partnership profits interest. Rather, section 83 was seemingly en-
acted to extend ordinary income treatment to transactions in-
volving restricted property which, prior to the enactment of sec-
tion 83, had offered an opportunity to transform otherwise ordi-
nary income into capital gain. If section 83 applies to all transfers
of "property," including partnership profits interests, then
74 I.R.C. § 83(a)(2).
75 Section 83's provisions deal almost exclusively with the means of valuing "re-
stricted property" and determining when the receipt of "restricted property" may be ap-
propriately taxed.
76 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(3) (1978).
77 UN. PARTNERasHp AcT § 26,6 U.L.A. 349 (1969).
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whenever an interest in a partnership is transferred under cir-
cumstances which could be interpreted as involving compensa-
tion for services, a three-step analysis seems appropriate.
The first determination is whether the transfer is in fact com-
pensation for services. For example, suppose our trainer contrib-
utes property or money to the partnership. It could be argued
that the trainer's interest in the partnership, albeit not in propor-
tion to his or her capital investment, has been received in consid-
eration of (1) contribution of property or money, and (2) antic-
ipated future participation in partnership management which
the partners expect will contribute more to the success of the
partnership than the participation of the other parties. Since the
trainer's receipt of any profits depends to a degree upon his or her
future efforts on behalf of the partnership, that part of the inter-
est received which is not in consideration of capital contribution
arguably represents no more than an unfunded promise to pay
for future services, which is not currently taxable. Under this
analysis, section 83 would not apply because the profits interest
received would not be transferable (in the sense that the trainer
would not ordinarily be permitted to assign his or her interest to
another trainer), and it would be subject to a "substantial risk of
forfeiture" in that the trainer's right to receive a share of the net
winnings would apparently terminate upon a cessation of trainer
services.
Second, it must be determined whether the trainer has re-
ceived a "capital" or a "profits" interest in the partnership. The
Code and regulations do not deal directly with this distinction
under either section 721 or section 83. However, a regulation
under the family partnership rules of section 704(e)(3) of the
Code does provide that for purposes of those rules
a capital interest in a partnership means an interest in the as-
sets of the partnership which is distributable to the owner of
the capital interest upon his withdrawal from the partnership
or upon liquidation of the partnership. The mere right to par-
ticipate in the earnings and profits of a partnership is not a
capital interest in the partnership.78
78 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(3)(1)(v), T.D. 6771, 1964-2 C.B. 177, 178.
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Whether a particular interest in a partnership constitutes a "cap-
ital" interest or a "profits" interest will therefore depend upon
the precise terms of the agreement between the parties.
Finally, the question of value must be addressed. It is con-
ceptually possible for a "profits" interest to have been transferred
as compensation for services, but the value of that interest might
be nominal or not ascertainable; thus, although the taxpayer will
have realized income that must be recognized, the amount of
such income may well be negligible. This situation could apply to
a trainer who receives only an interest in future net winnings,
which at the time of receipt is subordinate to the recovery by the
owner of substantial costs. 79 If the trainer receives, in addition to
the profits interest, normal and customary charges for training
the horse, the argument is made stronger because the Service will
not be able to contend that the value of the profits interest should
be measured by unpaid standard fees.se The attempt to minimize
the value of what the trainer received, however, or to defer the
time of taxation, will normally be at the expense of a reduction,
or deferral, of the deduction for the person transferring the inter-
est.
IV. EXOTICA: "RETROACTIVE" AND "SPECIAL" ALLOCATIONS
The natural economic rhythms of the equine industry, which
traditionally call for the purchase of horses in the second half of
the calendar year, and the relative simplicity of most equine
partnerships, in the sense that the finite number of animals in-
volved simplifies tax accounting problems, make equine partner-
ships a fertile ground for tax planning using "retroactive" and
"special" allocations.
79 Normally, this idea would be expressed by a partnership agreement provision to
the effect that cash distributions would go to the owner until he or she has recovered his
costs, or if the partnership is liquidated prior to recovery of those costs, the net proceeds of
the liquidation would be applied first to the owner's capital account.
80 Cf. Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl.
1954) (cost basis under § 1012 of property received in an exchange is fair market value of
property received; if that value cannot be determined with reasonable certainty, the fair
market value of the property exchanged will be presumed to be the value of the property
received).
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A. "Retroactive" Allocations
A "retroactive" allocation occurs when a partner who is ad-
mitted to the partnership subsequent to the beginning of its tax-
able year is allocated losses which have been economically in-
curred prior to his or her admission. In its most tax-aggressive
posture, the retroactive allocation question concerns whether
losses incurred by a partnership formed by a promoter early in
the calendar year, perhaps including losses generated by use of
the averaging conventions or other techniques to avoid the short
taxable year limitations, can be allocated to investors admitted to
the partnership in December.
1. Early Decisions
Although tax shelter promoters often touted retroactive allo-
cations, judicial decisions never established the legitimacy of
such allocations. In the leading case, Rodman v. Commissioner,81
a partnership believed that it had a substantial tax loss for the
year. A new partner, admitted in early November, purchased a
two-ninths interest in the partnership from two existing partners.
On the partnership return, the new partner was allocated two-
ninths of the partnership's loss for the entire year. The Tax Court
disallowed certain deductions, resulting in the partnership ac-
tually having a gain rather than a loss for the year.8 2 Not unex-
pectedly, the new partner then changed his position and con-
tended that he should be required to report only two-ninths of
the profits earned from the date of his admission to the end of the
year, rather than two-ninths of the entire year's profits., The
Tax Court, however, accepted the Commissioner's argument
that the retroactive allocation should be upheld, i.e., the new
partner should be taxed on two-ninths of the entire year's in-
come.84
On appeal, according to leading commentators, "sanity re-
81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1307 (1973), rev'd, 542 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1976).
82 542 F.2d at 857.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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turned,"85 and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the retroactive allocation was not permissible, relying both on
policy grounds and section 706(c)(2)(B). 86 That section provides
that a partner's distributive share of partnership income or loss
for a taxable year in which the partner "sells or exchanges" less
than his or her entire interest in the partnership "shall be deter-
mined by taking into account his varying interests in the partner-
ship during the taxable year."' s The appellate court reasoned
that Rodman involved a sale or exchange of partnership interests
by the two existing partners; thus, their shares of partnership
profits for the year had to include the share of profits earned
through October with respect to the two-ninths interest trans-
ferred to the new partner. Because the new partner could not be
allocated income reported by the two existing partners, the new
partner's allocation was limited to his pro rata share of profits
earned after his admission to the partnership. 8
2. Changes Under the 1976 Tax Reform Act
Retroactive allocations continued to be made after Rodman
because of technical deficiencies in the relevant Code provisions.
Under pre-1976 law, the "varying interests" rule of section 706(c)
(as referred to in the previous paragraph), while applicable in in-
stances where the new partner obtained an interest by sale or ex-
change, did not literally apply to the more common situation
where end-of-year investors were admitted to an already formed
partnership by making contributions to capital. 9 A second provi-
sion prior to 1976 which appeared to sanction retroactive alloca-
tions was section 704(a), under which a partner's distributive
share of income or loss was determined by the partnership agree-
ment, unless the agreement was found to be invalid9O because it
was formulated by the partners as a tax avoidance device. 9 Argu-
85 A. WILLIS, J. PENNEL & P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 87.02 (3d ed.
1982).
86 542 F.2d at 858.87 I.R.C. S 706(c)(2)(B) (1976).
88 542 F.2d at 858-59.
89 See I.R.C. § 706(c) (1954).
9D I.R.C. § 704(b) (1954).
91 I.R.C. § 704(a) (1954).
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ably, this tax avoidance test (contained in section 704(b)) was in-
applicable to retroactive allocations because the pre-1976 version
of section 704(b) only applied to allocations of "items" of part-
nership income or loss and did not apply to allocation of so-called
bottom line taxable income or loss.92
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 amended sections 704 and 706
to eliminate the more brazen forms of retroactive allocations.9 3
Section 704(b) was amended not only to replace the "tax avoid-
ance" test with the "substantial economic effect" test,94 but also
to extend to bottom line partnership income or loss as well as
items.95 The "varying interests" rule of section 706(c) was
amended to apply not only to a sale or exchange, but also to sit-
uations where a partner's interest is reduced "by entry of a new
partner, partial liquidation of a partner's interest, gift, or other-
wise."96 The legislative history of these amendments leaves abso-
lutely no doubt that their specific intention was to prevent retro-
active allocations. 7
3. Planning Opportunities
The 1976 legislation has not prevented careful tax planning
from achieving the same result as a retroactive allocation, as is il-
lustrated by the recent case of Richardson v. Commissioner.9s In
Richardson, new limited partners who contributed cash and
notes for the purpose of paying outstanding bills were admitted
to the partnership on December 31, at which time the accrued
but unpaid bills were paid with the new limited partners' funds.
The partnership agreement was amended to provide that ninety-
92 See I.R.C. § 704(b) (1954). For example, a retroactive allocation of deprecia-
tion-an "item"-would have come under § 704(b).
93 See 26 U.S.C. § I et. seq. (1976).
' See notes 109-112 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the require-
ments of the "substantial economic effect" test.
95 I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (1976).
96 I.R.C. § 706(c)(2)(B) (1976).
97 See STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 94th CONG., 2d Sess., GENERAL Ex-
PLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1976, p. 92-4 (1976).
98 76 T.C. 512 (1981). The case involved a pre-1976 fact situation, but the current
provisions of § 706 were applied. The Tax Court reasoned that the 1976 amendments did
not change the law, but simply codified prior law concerning the applicability of the
"varying interests" rule to newly admitted partners. Id. at 524.
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nine percent of the profits and losses for the entire year would be
allocated to the new partners." The Tax Court applied section
706(c) (2) (B) so that the new partners could not, by taking advan-
tage of the economic predicament of the partnership, simply be
allocated a percentage of partnership losses determined for the
entire taxable year. But the Tax Court further held that, in de-
termining losses which would have to be allocated both before
and after the admission of the new partners, a partnership may
use either an interim closing of the books or a proration method
in which the entire year's results are prorated among the partners
according to the portion of the taxable year which elapses before
and after the admission date.'°0
Applied to Richardson's facts, the availability of the interim
closing technique is critical. The Senate Financing Committee
Report which accompanied the 1976 amendment to section 706
states that, once the varying interests are determined, the income
and loss to be shared may be allocated by using
the easier method of prorating items according to the portion
of the year for which a partner was a partner, or the more pre-
cise method of an interim closing of books (as if the year had
closed) which, in some instances, will be more advantageous
where most of the deductible expenses were paid or incurred
upon or subsequent to the entry of the new partners in the
partnership. 10
If the interim closing method is used by a cash-basis partnership
and if the deductible expenses are paid (as they were in Richard-
son) after the admission of the new partners, then the partner-
ship's losses will be concentrated during the period after the ad-
mission of the new partners, and the new partners will be in the
same position as if a full retroactive allocation had been made.
The unresolved question is whether the holding in Richard-
son and a similar holding in a subsequent case, Roccaforte v.
Commissioner,10 2 can be extended to non-cash deductions such as
depreciation, where the property generating the deduction is ac-
9 Id. at 514-20.
'oo Id. at 526.
'0' S. REP. NO. 938,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1976).
102 77 T.C. 263 (1981).
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quired after the admission of new partners with funds supplied
by new partners. The use of the interim closing technique would
permit such an allocation, even though the allocation may, be-
cause of the averaging conventions or because of ACRS, involve a
deduction which is determined as if the property had been
owned by the partnership for a period prior to its acquisition.
Since the property will not have been acquired by the partner-
ship prior to the admission of the new partners, an interim clos-
ing of the books as of the date of their admission will produce no
depreciation or cost recovery deduction for the portion of the tax-
able year prior to the admission of the new partners. Rather, the
deduction will be confined to the portion of the year subsequent
to the admission of the new partners.
An alternative technique available to accrual basis partner-
ships where expenses have been prepaid is to select the proration
method of determining the income and losses allocable in accord-
ance with the "varying interests" rule. This will give the newly
admitted partners a share of deductions attributable to expenses
paid prior to their admission. 103
B. "Special" Allocations
In a straightforward partnership agreement, the tax inci-
dents of partnership operations are allocated among the partners
according to their percentage interests in the partnership.04 For
103 For accrual basis partnerships, the proration method will not, however, permit
newly admitted partners to share in depreciation deductions economically accrued prior
to their admission, i.e., incurred with respect to assets purchased prior to their admission.
Use of the accrual method may be disadvantageous for equine partnerships because it may
not only preclude the deduction of prepaid items, but also may require the capitalization
of costs of raisinghorses. See Treas. Beg. §§ 1.162-12(a), 1.1251-2(d).
104 Perhaps the most common method is simply to express the interests and percent-
ages. One sometimes encounters partnership agreements, however, which express the
partners' interests as percentages determined by dividing their capital contributions and
any additional contributions by the total capital contributions and additional contribu-
tions made by all partners. This latter scheme reflects a corporate mentality inasmuch as it
mirrors the fashion in which dividends are distributed based upon relative ownership of
shares. The idea works well enough when current distributions are being made by a part-
nership, but it can cause severe difficulties upon liquidation where appreciated assets are
sold for cash and the cash is distributed to the partners. If the appreciation is shared by the
partners in proportion to their percentages determined by capital contributions, a relative-
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example, in an equal three-person partnership, any partnership
income or loss for the year for tax purposes will be reported one-
third by each of the partners, and any separately stated items
will also be reported one-third by each partner.
A "special" allocation occurs when the partnership agree-
ment contains provisions that one or more partners will report
items of income or loss, or perhaps bottom line loss for tax pur-
poses, in a fashion different from their percentage interest in the
partnership. A special allocation provision need not affect the
distribution of cash to the partners during the taxable year in
which the special allocation is made. Thus, it is possible for the
partners to divide equally the cash flow from a partnership but to
report unequally the tax losses of the partnership which may
have been generated by depreciation after the cost recovery de-
ductions or other deductions. The important point is that a "spe-
cial" allocation by definition departs from a "regular" allocation,
which applies to items other than the specially allocated items.
Otherwise, the "special" allocation is the only allocation made by
the partnership agreement.
Under section 704(a), a partner's distributive share of income
(loss) or of any item of income (deduction) is determined "by the
partnership agreement,"'t 0 provided the allocation of distributive
shares in the partnership agreement has "substantial economic
effect."'10 The partners are free to allocate the tax incidents of
partnership operations between themselves in a fashion different
from 1) their proportionate capital contributions, or 2) their
"regular" share of partnership income or loss. Any such special
allocation is separately stated and does not go into the computa-
tion of bottom line partnership taxable income or loss. 41
1. Use of Special Allocations
Assume a partnership owns a number of broodmares. Nor-
ly small capital contribution made late in the life of the partnership and perhaps after the
majority of the appreciation occurred, can distort the amount of cash distributable to the
partners.
'0 I.R.C. § 704(a) (1976).
'o' I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (1976).
107 Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8)(i), T.D. 7728, 1980-2 C.B.
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mally, partnership taxable income would be computed by sub-
tracting out-of-pocket expenses such as board, farrier, veterinar-
ian services and insurance, plus cost recovery deductions from
gross receipts on the sale of the broodmares' offspring. The re-
sulting amount would constitute partnership taxable income or
loss, and each partner would report his or her distributive share
of that number. The partners may agree to a different scheme
which provides for a special allotment of all, or a portion, of an
item to one partner, provided the "substantial economic effect"
test is met.
The motive for special allocations is easy to discern: where
the partners are in different tax brackets or have different indi-
vidual tax profiles, the tax utility of a particular item may be
greater for one partner than for another. For example, a partner
may have significant short-term capital gains from other sources.
A special allocation of partnership short-term capital losses re-
duces this partner's tax burden to a much greater extent than the
shifting of short-term capital losses deprives the other partners of
usable deductions, because of the limits on the application of
capital losses against ordinary income under section 1211(b). 08 In
a second situation, one partner may be in the highest bracket for
a particular year (due to income from other sources) while
another partner may have little or no income from other sources
for a particular year. Under such circumstances, a special alloca-
tion of depreciation to the partner in the high bracket recom-
mends itself.
2. Substantial Economic Effect
Partners do not have unlimited freedom to "specially allo-
cate'" items of income and loss among themselves without regard
to economic reality. In 1976, Congress amended section
704(b) (2) to prohibit special allocations which do not "have sub-
stantial economic effect."'1 9 Basically, a special allocation has
substantial economic effect and is respected for tax purposes if: 1)
the allocation of an item of income or deduction to a particular
108 I.R.C. § 1211(b) (1976).
'0 I.R.C. § 704(b) (2) (1976).
1054 [Vol. 70
EQUINE PAurTNERSmPS
partner is credited to or charged against the partner's capital ac-
count, and 2) liquidation proceeds are distributed in accordance
with capital accounts. Thus, before the partners share in any li-
quidation proceeds according to their regular ratios, each part-
ner's capital account must be fully adjusted." 0 The allocation
must, at least potentially, affect the cash flow and property dis-
tributions from the partnership to the partners.
In Orrisch v. Commissioner,"' the partners agreed that de-
preciation would be specially allocated to one partner, but the
partnership agreement nonetheless provided that all cash and
property distributions to the partners, and all distributions upon
liquidation of the partnership, would be shared equally. The Tax
Court accordingly held that the allocation lacked substantial eco-
nomic effect because the tax allocation had no effect on the eco-
nomic sharing of profits and losses. 112
3. An Example of a Proper Special Allocation
Suppose X and Y own as partners a number of broodmares,
stallion shares and racehorses. X and Y have previously shared all
cash flow from the partnership and have allocated the tax inci-
dents of partnership operations equally. Their initial investment
in the partnership was equal, and each partner's current capital
account balance is $100,000. Each partner's basis in the partner-
ship is $100,000 and the partnership's basis for its depreciable as-
sets is $200,000. The partnership's cash expenses are exactly
matched by its cash revenues, so that for tax purposes the part-
nership will report a loss equal to its depreciation deduction for
the year.
Because X has substantial taxable income from other sources
and Y expects to have her income from other sources sheltered by
deductions from other investments, it appears that Y's share of
the depreciation deductions will shelter income taxable at a rate
much lower than X's rate. Because of this, the partners agree that
depreciation deductions will be allocated ninety percent to X and
ten percent to Y while all other partnership taxable income/loss
110 See Magazinerv. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 873 (1978).
... 55 T.C. 395 (1971), affdper curiam 31 A.F.T.R.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1973).
l 2 Id. at 399.
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will be allocated equally. The partnership agreement is further
amended to provide that the depreciation deductions will be
charged against X's capital account and that the proceeds re-
ceived when the partnership sells its horses will first be applied to
the extent of the capital accounts of the partners, with the re-
maining proceeds then divided equally. Under convenient anal-
ysis, this arrangement will pass the substantial economic effect
test.
Assuming that the partnership has a depreciation deduction
for the year in question of $100,000, a $90,000 deduction will be
allocated to X and a $10,000 deduction will be allocated to Y.
This will reduce the capital accounts of X and Y to $10,000 and
$90,000 respectively. If the partnership's horses are sold on the
first day of the next taxable year for $200,000, the partnership
will have a gain on the sale of $100,000 ($200,000 amount real-
ized minus adjusted basis of $100,000) which will be reported
equally by the partners. This reported gain will increase the re-
spective capital accounts of the partners to $60,000 for X and
$140,000 for Y. If the partnership were then immediately liqui-
dated, X would receive cash of $60,000 and Y would recive cash
of $140,000, n 3 and the special allocation would have had sub-
stantial economic effect.
4. Planning Techniques: Gain Chargebacks
Horse owners sometimes balk at the idea that the price of
"substantial economic effect" will be that dissolution proceeds
from the partnership will not be shared equally or in accordance
with their "regular" percentages. This practical difficulty often is
dealt with by what is known as a "gain chargeback" provision in
the partnership agreement. Such a provision provides that when
a special allocation has been made, any gain on the sale or other
disposition of the asset with respect to which the allocation was
113 This distribution produces a fair result, even though X receives less than Y. X has
already received a tax benefit as the result of the special allocation to him of $40,000 in de-
preciation deductions which otherwise would have been available to Y. At the same time,
Y has been required to report a taxable gain of $50,000 on the sale of the thoroughbreds,
$40,000 of which is directly attributable to the depreciation deductions specially allocated
to X.
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made will-to the extent of the allocation-be fully charged
back to the partner who benefited from the special allocation. In
our example, a gain chargeback provision would allocate the first
$80,000 of gain to X (of course X would have received $40,000 of
gain in the absence of the special allocation), with the remaining
$20,000 to be allocated between X and Y. This would increase
X's capital account to $100,000 and Y's capital account to
$100,000, thus permitting them to share equally the proceeds of
dissolution. Note that X will not receive in cash $90,000 of the
$100,000 gain on the disposition of the thoroughbreds. The gain
chargeback, like a special allocation on the front end, operates
only to affect the tax consequences of partnership transactions re-
ported by the partners and to affect the capital accounts, which
in turn will determine the amount of cash distributed to the part-
ners.1 4 Assuming that X was able to invest this $20,000 savings at
a pre-tax rate of return of sixteen percent, the value of the defer-
ral to him will be $1,600 ($20,000 times sixteen percent return
times fifty percent tax due equals $1,600). The value of deferral
obviously depends upon the tax bracket of the particular tax-
payer and the alternative uses of money, but it is easy to see how
a gain chargeback provision coupled with a special allocation,
perhaps heightened by the use of leverage, can produce substan-
tial net after-tax savings for horse owners.
V. LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES OF PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
A fashionable tax planning technique is the like-kind ex-
change. Because an asset which has appreciated in value can be
exchanged for one or more like-kind assets without recognition of
gain or loss, the technique offers the owner of the appreciated as-
114 The result is that, while X and Yeach get $100,000 cash, X reports a $90,000 gain
and Y reports only a $10,000 gain. Still, this is not unfair to X. X's reported gain is only
$40,000 in excess of what it would have been absent the special allocation. Assuming a
50% tax rate, X will pay an additional $20,000 in taxes (the entire amount of the gain
would be treated as ordinary income because of depreciation recapture); but in the pre-
ceding tax year, X was allowed the special depreciation deduction of $40,000 which saved
him $20,000 in taxes, so that the net tax effect of the special allocation and the gain
chargeback is zero. Actually, X has obtained an economic benefit, because he will have
the use of the $20,000 in tax savings for one year before he has to pay it back.
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set a way to diversify and cash in on an investment without in-
curring tax liability."5 Horses are eligible for like-kind exchanges,
although the statute does require that a horse be traded for other
horses of the same sex in order to be considered a like-kind ex-
change.116
The analytical difficulties of structuring like-kind exchanges
of thoroughbreds between partnerships are no different than
structuring similar exchanges between individuals. But suppose
that, for reasons unrelated to the exchange of the thoroughbreds,
the partners in both partnerships want to restructure their
ownership interests so that the partners will not only end up
owning different horses in their partnerships, but some partners
will end up owning interests in different partnerships. Can an ex-
change of partnership interests qualify as a like-kind exchange,
and thus not be considered a taxable transaction?
A. Section 1031 Reprise
The exchange of a partnership interest for property, just like
the sale of a partnership interest for cash, is obviously not a like-
kind exchange. Thus, gain or loss will be recognized to the extent
that the amount of cash and/or fair market value of the property
received exceeds or is less than the partner's adjusted basis for the
partnership interest transferred."7 Thus, for example, if a part-
ner exchanges his or her partnership interest for an interest as a
co-owner in a horse of racing age, the transaction will be a tax-
able one. Where a dissolution of the partnership followed by co-
ownership of the partnership's assets is not feasible,"" section
1031 of the Code, where applicable, may offer an alternative.
Section 1031(a) provides:
No gain or loss shall be recognized if properly held for produc-
tive use in trade or business or for investment (not including
15 I.R.C. § 1031 (1976).
116 I.R.C. § 1031(e) (West Supp. 1982).
117 I.R.C. § 741 (1976).
118 A frequently encountered problem occurs with a partnership which has such a
large number of partners that the co-ownership is simply too unwieldy a form of business
entity. Also, as noted above, a co-ownership may be treated as a partnership for federal in-
come tax purposes. See note 52 supra.
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stock in trade or other property held primarily for sale, nor
stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates of trust or
beneficial interest, or other securities or evidences of indebted-
ness or interests) is exchanged solely for property of a like-kind
to be held either for productive use in trade or business or for
investment. "9
Thus, to qualify under section 1031, the properties exchanged
must: 1) be of a like-kind; 2) not be of the type expressly excluded
by the parenthetical clause in section 1031(a), and 3) both before
and after the exchange, be held "for productive use in trade or
business or for investment."120
In planning a section 1031 exchange involving partnership
interests, two courses of action are possible. The partnerships can
first be dissolved, with the partners taking title to the horses in
their individual names, normally a non-taxable event. After the
transaction is allowed to cool, the former partners exchange
horses, and then contribute the received horses to new separate
partnerships in which the former partners' interests are different.
A second technique is simply to exchange the partnership inter-
ests directly between the partners.
The first technique- dissolution, swap and recontribution-
would satisfy the like-kind requirement and would not directly
fall within the parenthetical exclusionary clause of section 1031.
However, two obstacles to section 1031 treatment would be un-
avoidable. First, the Service could contend (since any cooling off
period would be rather short as a matter of business necessity)
that the transaction was in substance nothing more than a swap
of partnership interests regardless of its form, with the result that
the unsettled question as to whether an exchange of partnership
interests qualifies as a "like-kind" exchange will have to be faced.
Because the business realities of the transaction may well require
that the recontribution plan be set forth from the beginning, the
Service's chances of successfully invoking the form-over-sub-
stance doctrine would be good. Second, even if the transaction is
not treated by the Service as a swap of partnership interests, the
Service could contend that the thoroughbreds received upon dis-
119 I.R.C. § 1031(a) (1976).
12D Id.
1981-82] 1059
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
solution of the respective partnerships were not "held for produc-
tive use in trade or business or for investment," but were in real-
ity held for the purpose of being traded and recontributed to new
partnerships. This second danger is illustrated by Revenue Rul-
ing 77-337.121 There, the taxpayer, following a pre-arranged
plan, liquidated his corporation and immediately attempted to
exchange the real property which would otherwise qualify as
like-kind property under section 1031. The Service, ruling that
the taxpayer had never held the shopping center for productive
use or for investment, concluded that section 1031 treatment was
not available. 22
Analysis of whether a direct swap of partnership interests can
qualify under section 1031 must begin with the first case to con-
sider this question, Meyer v. Commissioner.122 In Meyer, the Tax
Court held that general partnership interests could be exchanged
tax-free under section 1031 as long as the underlying assets were
themselves eligible for like-kind treatment.2 4 The Service an-
nounced its nonacquiescence to the Meyer case in Revenue Rul-
ing 78-135,121 taking the position that partnership interests are
"securities" within the parenthetical exclusionary clause of sec-
tion 1031(a) and thus are never eligible for section 1031 treat-
ment.
In the second Tax Court case to consider the question, Gulf-
stream Land & Development Corp. v. Commissioner,1 the Tax
Court reaffirmed its Meyer holding that a like-kind exchange of
general partnership interests is permissible under section 1031.27
However, the Court denied summary judgment to the taxpayer
because the underlying property might have been inventory
property (and hence ineligible under the parenthetical exclusion-
ary clause) rather than property used in the trade or business or
held for investment. 1 8
121 1977-2 C.B. 305.
'2' Id. at 306.
'23 58 T.C. 311 (1972), affd per curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974), nonacq.,
1975-1 C.B. 3.
124 58 T.C. at 314.
125 1978-1 C.B. 256.
12 71 T.C. 587 (1979).
'2t Id. at 593-94.
128 Id. at 596-97.
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Revenue Ruling 77-321,'2 although issued prior to Gulf-
stream and Revenue Ruling 78-135, might support the argument
that partnership interests are not embraced by the parenthetical
exclusionary clause of section 1031. The ruling dealt with a tax-
payer who had caused his corporation to transfer all its assets-
which included money and securities-to a partnership in ex-
change for a partnership interest. The partnership interest was
then transferred to the shareholder in a section 333 liquidation of
the corporation, with the hope that since the corporation distrib-
uted no money or securities, gain could be avoided (the corpora-
tion had no current or accumulated earnings and profits). The
Service, relying on the step-transaction doctrine, restructured
the transaction as a distribution of assets by the corporation in a
section 333 liquidationfollowed by a contribution of assets to the
partnership by the distributive shareholders in exchange for the
partnership interest. 1' By implication, the partnership interest
received in the transaction as structured by the taxpayer was not
a "security" within the meaning of section 333(e)(2)-and by
analogy, not within the meaning of section 1031(a)'s exclusionary
clause-or otherwise the Service would not have had to restruc-
ture the transaction.
In Long v. Commissioner,'31 another recent case to consider
the qualification of partnership interests under section 1031, the
Tax Court firmly resisted the Service's contention that partner-
ship interests are either "choses in action" or "evidences
of... interest" within the parenthetical exclusionary clause.
The court permitted an exchange of general partnership interests
to qualify under section 1031 after finding that the underlying as-
sets were of the same type and the partnerships were engaged in
the same principal activity. 32 The case does not, however, make
it clear whether the look-through approach requires that all the
assets of the two partnerships qualify for like-kind exchange
treatment. Rather, the Tax Court seemed more concerned with
making sure "that the exchange of partnership interests does not
"9 1977-2 C.B. 99.
13 Id.
'31 77 T.C. 1045 (1981).
132 Id. at 1068.
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shield a transaction which could not have otherwise qualified
under section 1031(a)."'3 But the court said that "[fin making
this analysis, it should be emphasized that the determination of
whether the exchange initially qualifies as a like-kind under sec-
tion 1031(a) will be applied to the partnership interests and not
on a partnership-asset-by-partnership-asset approach."' In Pap-
pas v. Commissioner,' the Tax Court reaffirmed its position
that partnership interests are not "choses in action" or evidences
of interest within the parenthetical exclusionary clause and per-
mitted a tax-free exchange of general partnership interests in
hotel partnerships.
B. Planning the Exchange
Like-kind exchanges of partnership interests might be used
where two partnerships both own horses of different sexes (al-
though this result is not perfectly clear). Because the statute itself
prevents an exchange of horses of different sexes from qualifying
as like-kind property, 13 it may, as a practical matter, be difficult
to structure a non-taxable deal directly between individual co-
owners. The relative values of the horses of the same sex to be
traded, the liabilities encumbering those horses, and the desired
after-exchange ownership percentages inhibit the deal. A like-
kind exchange of partnership interests, on the other hand, per-
mits adjustments to be made from an aggregate standpoint, i.e.,
by taking into account all the horses of both sexes, all the liabil-
ities and the percentage ownership interests in all the horses de-
sired to be retained following the transaction. Assuming that
Long and its predecessors do not require an asset-by-asset, look-
through qualification, a like-kind exchange of partnership inter-
ests in partnerships owning horses of both sexes may be a way to
accomplish a tax-free exchange which cannot, as a practical mat-
ter, be accomplished by a direct exchange. Long's admonition
that a partnership interest exchange not be used to "shield a
133 Id. at 1069.
134 Id. at 1068.
135 78 T.C. 77 (1982).
'1 I.R.C. § 1031(e) (West Supp. 1982).
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transaction which could not have otherwise qualified under sec-
tion 1031(a)"137 should be read to refer to an exchange of assets
otherwise denied section 1031 treatment, such as those embraced
by the parenthetical exclusionary clause. Long does not prohibit
the use of a partnership exchange in which the parties involved
adjust, in a fashion satisfactory to all concerned, their ownership
interests in assets which themselves clearly qualify for section
1031 treatment., 8
CONCLUSION
Thoroughbred racing's epithet as the sport of kings is well de-
served these days, if only by virtue of the royal prices paid for
thoroughbred yearlings and bloodstock. As the cost of top quality
thoroughbreds increases, the way the industry attracts capital
also is changing. Within the past three years alone, at least five
publicly registered offerings of interest in thoroughbred oper-
ations have been marketed, and the number of private place-
ments of multi-investor deals of substantial stature must be well
into the hundreds. The natural structure for increased public in-
vestment in the industry is the partnership, and more specifical-
ly, the limited partnership. The limited partnership combines
the tax advantages of individual ownership of property with the
statutory assurance of limited liability that an investor generally
demands when most operational decisions are reserved for a
managing agent/general partner.
These developments will continue and the use of partnerships
in the equine industry will expand further. We hope that the
techniques outlined in this Article may help bring new investors
some of the excitement and pleasure which go with the owner-
ship of thoroughbreds and will help ease some of the frustrations
37 77 T.C. at 1069.
138 Taxpayers contemplating an exchange of syndicate shares in different stallions
may also wish to rely on the analysis which prevailed in Long and Meyer if the Service ar-
gues that syndicate shares are "choses in action" or "evidences of ... interest" within the
parenthetical exclusionary clause of § 1031(a). However, the Guggenheim case, which
holds that an individual who sells stallion shares pursuant to a syndication of a stallion he
or she owned had sold undivided fractional interests in the stallion, is authority for the
proposition that the stallion shares are not "choses in action" or "evidences of interest" un-
der§ 1031(a). 46 T.C. at 559.
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with the Service experienced by those already involved in
thoroughbred partnerships.
